By r0gu3Sec | October 22, 2016 - 07:10 | Posted in CyberGuerrilla | Comments Off on Hacker-Proof Code Confirmed
Hacker-Proof Code Confirmed

Hacker-Proof Code Confirmed

Computer scientists can prove certain programs to be error-free with the same certainty that mathematicians prove theorems.

The advances are being used to secure everything from unmanned drones to the internet.

When the project started, a “Red Team” of hackers could have taken over the helicopter almost as easily as it could break into your home Wi-Fi. But in the intervening months, engineers from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) had implemented a new kind of security mechanism a software system that couldn’t be commandeered.

Key parts of Little Bird’s computer system were unhackable with existing technology, its code as trustworthy as a mathematical proof.

Even though the Red Team was given six weeks with the drone and more access to its computing network than genuine bad actors could ever expect to attain, they failed to crack Little Bird’s defenses.

“They were not able to break out and disrupt the operation in any way,” said Kathleen Fisher, a professor of computer science at Tufts University and the founding program manager of the High-Assurance Cyber Military Systems (HACMS) project. “That result made all of DARPA stand up and say, oh my goodness, we can actually use this technology in systems we care about.”

The technology that repelled the hackers was a style of software programming known as formal verification. Unlike most computer code, which is written informally and evaluated based mainly on whether it works, formally verified software reads like a mathematical proof: Each statement follows logically from the preceding one.

An entire program can be tested with the same certainty that mathematicians prove theorems.

The aspiration to create formally verified software has existed nearly as long as the field of computer science. For a long time it seemed hopelessly out of reach, but advances over the past decade in so-called “formal methods” have inched the approach closer to mainstream practice.

Today formal software verification is being explored in well-funded academic collaborations, the U.S. military and technology companies such as Microsoft and Amazon.

The interest occurs as an increasing number of vital social tasks are transacted online. Previously, when computers were isolated in homes and offices, programming bugs were merely inconvenient.

Now those same small coding errors open massive security vulnerabilities on networked machines that allow anyone with the know-how free rein inside a computer system.

In October 1973 Edsger Dijkstra came up with an idea for creating error-free code. While staying in a hotel at a conference, he found himself seized in the middle of the night by the idea of making programming more mathematical.

As he explained in a later reflection, “With my brain burning, I left my bed at 2:30 a.m. and wrote for more than an hour.” That material served as the starting point for his seminal 1976 book, “A Discipline of Programming,” which, together with work by Tony Hoare (who, like Dijkstra, received the Turing Award, computer science’s highest honor), established a vision for incorporating proofs of correctness into how computer programs are written.

It’s not a vision that computer science followed, largely because for many years afterward it seemed impractical  if not impossible to specify a program’s function using the rules of formal logic.

Over at Microsoft Research, software engineers have two ambitious formal verification projects underway. The first, named Everest, is to create a verified version of HTTPS, the protocol that secures web browsers and that Wing refers to as the “Achilles heel of the internet.”

The second is to create verified specifications for complex cyber-physical systems such as drones. Here the challenge is considerable.

Where typical software follows discrete, unambiguous steps, the programs that tell a drone how to move use machine learning to make probabilistic decisions based on a continuous stream of environmental data.

It’s far from obvious how to reason about that kind of uncertainty or pin it down in a formal specification. But formal methods have advanced a lot even in the last decade, and Wing, who oversees this work, is optimistic formal methods researchers are going to figure it out.

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